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COMMENTS
HIT-AND-RUN STATUTES, REQUIRED INFORMATION AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
Byers v. Justice Court for the Ukiah Jud. Dist., - Cal.2d -, 458
P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969)
Defendant Byers was involved in an automobile accident. He was
apprehended and prosecuted for improper passing' and violation of
California's hit-and-run statute by failing to stop and divulge his
identity.2 Superior court granted a writ of prohibition enjoining the
trial court3 from further proceedings on the hit-and-run charge holding
that it could not be applied against the defendant without infringing
his privilege against self-incrimination. The district court of appeals
affirmed' and the state appealed to the Supreme Court of California.5
Held: affirmed. The privilege against self-incrimination applies if an
automobile driver involved in an accident is confronted with a statutory
requirement to stop and disclose his identity and he reasonably believes
that compliance will provide a link in the chain of evidence to support
I. CAL VEHICLE CODE § 21750 (Doering Supp. 1970).
2 CAL VEHICLE CODE § 20002(a) (Deering Supp. 1970). The statute considered by Byers has
since been amended in several respects not material to the case. The statute now reads:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to any property
including vehicles shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall
then and there either: (1) Locate and notify the owner or person in charge of such property
of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle involved, or; (2) Leave in
a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other proper damaged a written notice giving the
name and address of the owner of the vehicle involved and a statement of the circumstances
thereof and shall without unnecessary delay notify the police department of the city wherein
the collision occurred or, if the collision occurred in unincorporated territory, the local
headquarters of the Department of the California Highway Patrol. Any person failing to
stop or to comply with said requirements under such circumstances is guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail not to exceed six months or by a fine of not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) or
by both.
See also CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 20001, 20003-04, 20006 (Deering Supp. 1970) which deals with
related circumstances, including accidents in which there have been personal injuries, and CAL.
VEHICLE CODE § 20002 (Deering Supp. 1970) in which the section in issue here is recodified.
3. Justice Court for the Ukiah Judicial District of Mendocino County.
4. Byers v, Justice Court for the Ukiah Jud. Dist., - Cal. App. - 71 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1968).
5. Byers v. Justice Court for the Ukiah Jud. Dist., - Cal.2d _, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal.
Rptr 553 (1969).
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an independent but related criminal conviction.6 Nevertheless, the court
did not invalidate the hit-and-run statute. It merely imposed an
evidentiary restriction upon the use of the disclosed information in any
criminal proceeding arising from the accident.
The court substantially based its holding on recent United States
Supreme Court decisions which hold that the fifth amendment is a
defense to a criminal prosecution for violation of registration statutes
requiring a person subject to their provisions to provide information
which might be self-incriminating under other statutes.7 However, the
California court did not wish to make the statute unenforceable
because the legislative purpose was not prosecutorial; it was intended
to assist in satisfying civil liabilities.'
The California court initially rejected a theory of implied waiver of
the fifth amendment by the motorist when he uses the roadway.,
Instead, the court found that the crucial inquiry in applying the fifth
amendment standard is whether the individual faces "substantial
hazards of self-incrimination" because 'in his particular case" 'there
is a probability that the disclosed information could assist in securing
6. Id. at....._, 458 P.2d at 471, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
7. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965). See
also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), deciding the same point of law but handed down
too late for consideration by the California court.
8. Byers v. Justice Court for the Ukiah Jud. Dist., - Cal.2d ., -, 458 P.2d 465, 475,
80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 563 (1969).
9. The rejection of the implied waiver theory was based on the authority of an earlier state
case involving a question of waiver by acceptance of public employment. Bagley v. Washington
Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966) cited by the Byers
court at - Cal.2d _, _ 458 P.2d 465, 471-72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 559-60. The Bagley
courf imposed three requirements before the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination
could be conditioned on the waiver of a constitutional right:
(1) that the political restraints rationally relate to the enhancement of the public service,
(2) that the benefits which the public gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting
impairment of constitutional rights, and (3) that no alternatives less subversive of
constitutional rights are available.
65 Cal.2d at _ 421 P.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 403. The Byers court attempted to show
that the third requirement (the absence of alternatives) is not met here because of the availability
of the immunity doctrine. Therefore, no waiver could be found. - Cal.2d at _ 458 P.2d
at 472-78, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 560-66.
For other authorities concluding that the doctrine of waiver of a constitutional right no longer
is viable, see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENcE 283 (1954); Mansfield, The
Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's
Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. Rav. 103, 143-44; Note, Required Information and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 686-87 (1965); Comment, Criminal
Procedure-Prohibition Against Self-Incrimination Under the Federal Wagering Tax Statutes, 20
S.C.L. REv. 463,466-69 (1968).
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his conviction of a criminal offense.'0 Byers was found to have had
reasonable grounds to apprehend that a disclosure of his identity would
have subjected him to a substantial hazard of self-incrimination. To
support this assertion, the court noted Byers' subsequent prosecution
under the improper passing statute."
Forty-seven states have hit-and-run statutes similar to that of
California. 2 Fourteen of these statutes have been challenged under
either state or federal self-incrimination provisions. All statutes have
been upheld.' 3 Some of these decisions have been based on a finding of
an implied waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. 4 Others have been
based on the absence of any hazard of self-incrimination, purportedly
because an independent statute imposes the substantive offense.,5 Most
of the cases which found an absence of self-incrimination were decided
before the fifth amendment was applied to the states" and prior to the
Marchetti line of cases which further delineated the standard to be
applied to a statutory disclosure requirement.' 7
One of the earliest such cases upon which the Byers court relied was
Albertson v. SACB 8 in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the fifth amendment applies where compulsory registration as a
10. - Cal.2d at - 458 P.2d at 468, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
11. Id. at - 458 P.2d at 477, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
12. The exceptions are Hawaii and Louisiana.
13. But see Rembrandt v. City of Cleveland, 28 Ohio App. 4, 161 N.E. 364 (1927) in which a
similar city ordinance was held to be unconstitutional.
14. State v. Razey, 129 Kan. 328, 282 P. 755 (1929); State v. Sterrin, 78 N.H. 220, 98 A.
482 (1916); People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913); Scott v. State, 90 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 100. 233 S.W. 1097 (1921).
15. Woods v. State, 15 Ala. App. 251, 73 So. 129 (Ct. App. 1916); State v. Benham, 58 Ariz.
129, 118 P.2d 91 (1941); In re Jones, 130 Fla. 66, 178 So. 424 (1938); People v. Lucus, 41 111.
2d 370, 243 N.E.2d 228 (1968); Ule v. State, 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140 (1935); Commonwealth
v. Joyce, 326 Mass. 751, 97 N.E.2d 192 (1951); People v. Thompson, 259 Mich. 109, 242 N.W.
857 (1932); Ex parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983 (1912); Moore v. State, 12 Ohio L.
Abs. 92 (Ct. App. 1931). See also United States v. Smith, 9 U.S.M.C.A. 240, 26 C.M.R. 20
(1958) in which a similar military regulation was upheld against a fifth amendment challenge.
The Supreme Court in Byers overruled four California Court of Appeals decisions which had
upheld the hit-and-run statute on grounds similar to those found in the cases cited above. See
People v. Bammes, - Cal. App. 2d - 71 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1968); People v. Limon, 252 Cal.
App. 2d 575, 60 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1967); People v. Fodera, 33 Cal. App. 8, 164 P. 22 (1917); People
v. Diller, 24 Cal. App. 799, 142 P. 797 (1914). The Diller court indicated that the fifth amendment
privilege might apply if there was a criminal charge involved. People v. Diller, 24 Cal. App. 799,
800, 142 P. 797,798 (1914).
16. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964) held that the fifth amendment applies to the states
and requires that federal standards govern assertion of the privilege.
17 See note 7, supra.
18. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
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communist necessarily admitted a crime under the Smith Act.
Marchetti v. United States9 extended Albertson by holding that the
fifth amendment is also a defense to a prosecution for failing to register
an intent to gamble under a wagering tax statute when the disclosed
information could be used to assist in convicting the registrant under
state laws prohibiting gambling. The composite standard that
eventually evolved applies the fifth amendment privilege if the claimant,
when confronted by substantial and real hazards of self-incrimination,2
is required under threat of criminal prosecution 2' to provide
information which he might reasonably suppose would be available to
prosecuting authorities22 and which would furnish a significant link in
the chain of evidence tending to establish his guilt.zI
However, in People v. Lucus,?4 the Illinois Supreme Court applied
the federal standard and still found no substantial hazard of self-
incrimination presented by a similar hit-and-run statute. The Illinois
court based its conclusion on the fact that the disclosure statute is not
aimed at a highly select group of individuals inherently suspect of
criminal activities. Further, only the driver's identification is required;
the circumstances of the accident are not required to be divulged.4
The question raised, then, is whether the California court correctly
applied the fifth amendment standard in view of the contrary result
reached in Lucus. The Byers court attempted to distinguish Lucus
because in that case there was no criminal charge other than leaving
the scene of the accident. Thus, it could be argued that "there was no
showing that [Lucus] had any basis for a reasonable fear that
compliance with the 'hit-and-run' statute would lead to self-
incrimination. ' 26 The distinction drawn by the California court seems
19. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
20. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 66-67 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39, 53 (1968); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 600 (1896). The language of the test traditionally is attributed to Regina v. Boyes, 121 Eng.
Rep. 730 (1861).
21. See note 7, supra.
22. See note 7, supra.
23. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479
(1951).
24. 41111. 2d 370, 243 N.E.2d 228 (1968).
25. But see Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 103, 122 (1966)
where the author contends that the only question involved in a hit-and-run violation may be
whether the defendant was the operator of the vehicle because from other information, it may be
clear that whoever was driving the vehicle was guilty of a crime.
26. - Cal.2d at _, 458 P.2d at 469 n.4, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 557 n.4.
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insignificant. First, the discussion in Lucus was directed toward the
requirements imposed upon the defendant in his particular case. The
presence or absence of a second criminal charge was not mentioned.
Secondly, the Illinois court relied for support on several cases in other
states in which there clearly was ground for other criminal charges
arising out of the automobile accident. 27
The different results in Byers and Lucus can be explained by using
another distinction. The courts did not differ on the nature of the
standard to be applied2s but rather on the manner of application. The
California court looked at the hazard to the individual but the Illinois
court examined the potential hazard to the entire class of persons
subject to the statute. What may be substantial hazard to a single
individual may become insignificant and remote when viewed in a
larger context of applicability to a group, many members of which
probably are innocent of any crime.
The accuracy of the Byers decision hinges upon the California
court's interpretation of the fifth amendment as applied to statutory
disclosure incidents in recent United States Supreme Court cases.29 In
each of those cases, the Supreme Court found that a characteristic
common to all challenged registration statutes was their direction at
selective groups inherently suspect of criminal activities.3 However, the
California court properly emphasized that the likelihood of prosecution
and the direction of the statute at suspect groups such as gamblers and
narcotics peddlers are merely elements in determining whether the
hazard presented is real and substantial. The Supreme Court has held
that the self-incrimination privilege applies only in instances where
there is a substantial hazard of self-incrimination. If there are other
27. 41 111. 2d at 373, 243 N.E.2d at 231. See, e.g., Ule v. State, 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140
(1935); Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326 Mass. 751, 97 N.E.2d 192 (1951); Exparte Kneedler, 243
Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983 (1912). In each case, a pedestrian was killed in the accident giving rise
to the prosecution under the hit-and-run charge.
28. The language used by the California and Illinois courts to phrase the test is substantially
identical. The Lucus court, citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968), said:
The central standard for the privilege's application has been whether the claimant is
confronted by substantial and "'real", not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of
incrimination.
41111. 2d at 374, 243 N.E.2d at 231.
29. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
30. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 96 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62,
68 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968). See also Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6 (1969); Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70,79 (1965).
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incriminating circumstances, such as the violation of another statute as
in Byers and Marchetti, then the privilege applies once the personal
effect of the disclosure is considered. 31 However, an individual not
threatened under all the circumstances by self-incrimination is not
excused from compliance.
Although the California court did not make the privilege a defense
to failure to comply with the hit-and-run statute, it nevertheless granted
an immunity from prosecution based on information supplied. 31 Both
the privilege against self-incrimination and the legislative policy were
allowed to prevail. Yet in the Marchetti line of cases, the legislative
purpose was, for all practical purposes, curtailed.3 That difference may
exist because it is arguably easier to validate a statute, or at least
maintain its enforceability, when the purpose of the required disclosure
is not the detection of crimeu and where the statutory purpose cannot
be achieved using alternative means. The purpose of the tax registration
statute involved in Marchetti was the detection and prevention of
crime. 5 That purpose can be achieved by other methods. To the
contrary, the satisfaction of civil liabilities often can be achieved only
by requiring the driver involved to disclose his identity.
Although the Byers court discounted the importance of a statute
directed at a selected group of individuals suspect of criminal activity,
many federal court decisions have based their opinions primarily upon
that requirement." The fact remains, however, that since Byers had
31. Byers v. Justice Court for the Ukiah Jud. Dist., - Cal.2d ...- , - 458 P.2d 465,
470, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 558 (1969).
32. - Cal.2d _ . 458 P.2d 465, 477, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 565. The court directed
that:
[W]here compliance with [the] section . . . would otherwise be excused by assertion of the
privilege, compliance is, as in other cases, mandatory and state prosecuting authorities are
precluded from using the information . . . or its fruits in connection with any criminal
prosecution related to the accident.
Id. at _ 458 P.2d at 477, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 565. Although the court found that assertion of
the privilege is not to be a defense to non-compliance with the statute, nevertheless, it allowed
defendant Byers to be released on an expression of judicial "fairness." See also Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
33. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). See also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969).
34. Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 103, 140 (1966).
35. See McClellan, GAMBLING REP., S. REP. #1310, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1962). See also
HEARINGS BEFORE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess., pt 3 at 1119 (1965).
36. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 284 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); United States v.
Richardson, 284 F. Supp. 419 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
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already allegedly committed a crime, the Byers decision is a stronger
case for using the fifth amendment privilege than the Marchetti line of
cases. In Marchetti, the defendant was required to register merely a
future intent to commit the possible state crime of gambling. Although
Marchetti lends support to Byers, the California court could have
disposed of the case simply on the basis that the disclosure of
information would have admitted the completion of an already
committed crime analogous to the Albertson situation.
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